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HYPNOSIS IN COURT: A NEW TWIST ON THE OLD
MEMORY GAME
Law enforcement personnel have increasingly employed hypno-
tists to aid their criminal investigations. Under hypnosis, a wit-
ness who cannot remember a traumatic criminal encounter can
be helped to resurrect the emotionally suppressed recall. Unfor-
tunately, due to the inability of the hypnotic process to produce
consistently reliable results, courts have expressed a reluctance
to admit these memories into evidence. This comment examines
how various jurisdictions have chosen to address the accuracy
problems associated with hypno-enhanced memories. The arti-
cle begins with a historical sketch of the treatment accorded
hypnosis in related cases, and discusses the merit of each ap-
proach. Concluding that none of these judicial strategies has ef-
fectively resolved the issue, the author offers a novel approach
aimed at finding a more appropriate resolution of the hypnosis
controversy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years various jurisdictions have addressed the issue of
whether a witness whose memory has been refreshed under hypnosis
should be allowed to testify in a criminal case;1 the results have been
anything but consistent. The issue normally arises when a potential
eyewitness, who has suppressed the memory of a traumatic criminal
encounter,2 is subjected to pretrial hypnosis in an effort to lower the
emotional barriers that are blocking conscious recall of the incident.
At the conclusion of the session, the previously amnesic subject often
emerges from the hypnotic trance with an improved ability to recall the
incident. Since these memories are often inaccurate, legal problems
arise when the witness is asked to draw upon these resurrected memo-
ries and identify3 the individual who committed the crime.
1. Still unresolved is whether a cognizable difference exists between the admissibility
of post-hypnotic recall in criminal and civil cases. Jurisdictions that exclude post-
hypnotic recall probably do not recognize a difference. See Lemieux v. Superior
Court, 132 Ariz. 214, 644 P.2d 1300 (1982) (hypnosis inadmissible in civil cases).
Conversely, courts that admit the evidence often provide for a more vigorous evi-
dentiary foundation in criminal cases. Compare United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d
193, 199 n.2 (9th Cir.) (must meet certain procedural prerequisites), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1006 (1978) with Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975)
(no prerequisites for civil case); see also Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, 430 So.
2d 1051, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (difference recognized).
2. The egregious level of brutality and sexual perversion related in the hypnosis de-
cisions makes it easy to understand why victims have difficulty in consciously
recalling the horrifying experience. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d
86 (1981) (victim repeatedly stabbed); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super.
171, 172, 439 A.2d 805, 806 (1982) (in an incident characterized as "gruesome,"
the victim was beaten, raped by several men, and had her throat slit).
3. The use of hypnosis to obtain eyewitness testimony should be distinguished from
instances where it has been used to gather investigative leads. Eg., State v. Po-
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The admissibility of this type of evidence depends on how a partic-
ular jurisdiction has chosen to address the accuracy problems that
plague hypno-enhanced recollections. Some states have adopted an
"open door" policy. Under this approach, the evidence is admitted and
the task of evaluating its reliability is delegated to the trier of fact. A
second group has imposed an outright ban on this testimony. A third
cluster has opted for a prophylactic approach that attempts to insulate
the trier of fact from any prejudicial impact by imposing strict proce-
dural guidelines on how the sessions are to be conducted.
This comment examines the inability of these judicial strategies to
resolve effectively important issues raised by the use of post-hypnotic
recall to obtain a conviction. This analysis will review the historical
interaction between hypnosis and the legal system, set forth the most
commonly cited problems with the use of hypnosis to refresh memo-
ries, and examine the merit of the three approaches taken to resolve
these issues. The comment concludes with a suggestion that will lead
to a more appropriate resolution of the hypnosis issue.
II. BACKGROUND
Few subjects conjure up a greater wealth of misconceptions than
hypnosis. Many view hypnosis as a parlor trick practiced by carnival
mystics while others conceive of it as an evil device used by sinister
villains to enslave the minds of unsuspecting victims. Since World War
II, however, it has evolved well beyond these realms by becoming an
accredited medical phenomenon4 that has received approval from the
American Medical Association.'
Although the term hypnosis derives from the Greek word for
sleep, it is the "very opposite of sleep."' 6 Indeed, hypnosis is a height-
ened state of concentration and alertness in which the subject is able to
focus on a specific thought or memory, to the exclusion of all else.7
land, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982) (hypnosis used to obtain evidence relied
upon in stating probable cause for a warrant); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702-
03, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044-45 (1983) (authorizing the use of carefully monitored
investigative hypnosis, even though the court barred the use of post-hypnotic
testimony).
4. These medical uses include controlling pain, obesity, smoking, impotence, and
psychosomatic illnesses.
5. 168 J.A.M.A. 186 (1958). The American Medical Association's (AMA) Council
on Mental Health concluded that "[t]he use of hypnosis has a recognized place in
the medical armamentarium and is a useful technique in the treatment of certain
illnesses." Id at 187; see also 1955-1 BRIT. MED. J. 1019-20 (British approval
influenced the AMA).
6. Spiegel, Hypnosis and Evidence.- Hep or Hindrance, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
ScL. 73, 73 (1980).
7. H. SPIEGEL & D. SPEIGEL, TRANCE AND TREATMENT: CLINICAL USES OF HYP-
NOSIS 23 (1978). A precise explanation of how hypnosis operates has eluded med-
ical science; for a good summary of various theories, see H. CRASILNECK & J.
HALL, CLINICAL HYPNOSIS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION 13-35 (1975) [herein-
after cited as CRASILNECK & HALL].
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The use of hypnosis to stimulate recall has been likened to retrieving
information from a file cabinet.8 Ordinarily, an individual's conscious
thought process controls the storage and retrieval of information in the
files of his unconscious memory. When a traumatic criminal encounter
impedes this retrieval process, the probing hypnotist is able to reduce
the obstruction to a level where the conscious mind can once again
access the files.9
Despite its recognition as an identifiable medical phenomenon, the
hypnotic process has thus far eluded all scientific efforts to explain its
operation.' 0 And it is these unsolved mysteries that have formed the
catalyst for many of the legal debates.
A. Legal History
Judicial arguments over the proper role hypnosis should have in
the courtroom predate the current debate over the proper use of hyp-
notically stimulated testimony. These early decisions are important be-
cause they highlight commonly held misconceptions about the nature
of the hypnotic trance. Many of these cases also reflect a judicial skep-
ticism about the reliability of the hypnotic process that has permeated
the conflict over its use to enhance recall."l
The earliest decisional law and commentary focused primarily on
the mistaken belief that hypnotists could dominate the minds of their
subjects. Indeed, virtually all of these decisions involved allegations
that an unscrupulous hypnotist had either sexually assaulted entranced
victims'2 or had compelled a hypnotized dupe to commit a crime.' 3
For example, in Louis v. State'4 the Supreme Court of Alabama was
asked to decide whether a defendant could commit a robbery by ab-
8. C. HARTLAND, MEDICAL AND DENTAL HYPNOSIS AND ITS CLINICAL APPLICA-
TION 13-14 (1971).
9. Id at 13-16.
10. See generally CRASILNECK & HALL, supra note 7, at 13-35 (review of the different
scientific explanations).
11. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
12. Austin v. Barker, 90 A.D. 351, 85 N.Y.S. 465 (1904), af'd, 110 A.D. 510, 96 N.Y.S.
814 (1906). See generaly Lawrence & Campbell, Forensic Hypnosis in the Late
Nineteenth Century, 31 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 266, 269-
74 (1983) (outlining many unreported cases); Comment, Legal Aspects of Hypno-
tism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 176-80 (1902) (author notes many early cases); Annot., 40
L.R.A. 269 (1898) (discusses many unreported cases).
13. Lawrence & Campbell, supra note 12, at 274-77 (good collection of unreported
decisions); Comment, supra note 12, at 180-83; Annot., 40 L.R.A. 269 (1898). For
more contemporary authority on the subject, see United States v. Phillips, 515 F.
Supp. 758 (E.D. Ky. 1981). In Phillips, a wife on trial for helping her husband
escape from federal custody claimed that he had manipulated her through hypno-
sis. The trial judge remarked that this case was one of the most dramatic and
spellbinding trials he had ever seen. Id at 759. In addition, one of the most
newsworthy reports of the use of hypnotism to compel individuals to commit
crimes was the 1969 murder of actress Sharon Tate by the followers of Charles
Manson. Clark, Hypnosis as a Defense, 10 U. BALT. L. FORUM 14 (1979).
14. 24 Ala. App. 120, 130 So. 904 (1930).
[Vol. 13
Hypnosis in Court
sconding with funds withdrawn by a depositor whom he had hypno-
tized. Although the court ruled that the requisite element of force or
threat of force was absent, it never expressed any doubt that the de-
fendant had actually controlled the victim's free will.' 5
A more contemporary conffict has developed over defensive use of
hypnosis. 6 Occasionally, clever defense attorneys have sought to have
a hypnotist comment upon the accused's rendition of the facts.' 7 The
theory behind this proffer is that hypnotized persons cannot lie; there-
fore, the hypnotist, since he hypnotized and questioned the defendant
about the alleged criminal incident, can offer an expert opinion that is
relevant to whether the defendant is telling the truth. Since this under-
lying assumption is false,' s virtually all jurisdictions have rejected these
obvious efforts to bolster witness credibility.19
In a different context, hypnotists have also been requested to
render expert opinions concerning a defendant's ability to entertain the
requisite criminal intent. Presumably, the accused will relive the inci-
dent while under hypnosis, and the observant hypnotist will be able to
gauge the thoughts that were going through his mind.2" While this
strategy has proven successful in at least one jurisdiction,2' it has stead-
fastly been rejected by most others because the hypnotic process is
15. Id at 121, 130 So. at 905; see also State v. Donovan, 128 Iowa 44, 102 N.W. 791
(1905); State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283 (1905). Exactly how much influ-
ence a hypnotist can exert over a subject's free will remains the subject of some
dispute. Compare Orne, Can .4 Hypnotized Subject be Compelled to Carry Out
Otherwise Unacceptable Behavior 20 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYP-
NOSIS 101 (1972) (limited influence) with Perry, Hypnotic Coercion and Compliance
to Wit: A Review of Evidence Presented in a Legal Case, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 187 (1979) (great influence).
16. In a few instances defendants have sought to have either themselves or a witness
hypnotized. While at least one jurisdiction has recognized that the accused has a
constitutional right to refresh his memory through hypnosis, Cornell v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959); contra Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F.
Supp. 1113, 1120-21 (W.D. Va. 1976); Sheppard v. Koblentz, 174 Ohio St. 120,
122-23, 187 N.E.2d 40, 41-42 (1962), attempts to compel witnesses and jurors to
submit to hypnosis have been steadfastly rejected. United States v. Brooks, 677
F.2d 907, 914 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982); People v. Renslow, 98 Ill. App. 3d 288, 293,
423 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 (1981); see also People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App. 2d 284, 338
P.2d 495 (1959) (defendant has no right to be hypnotized in the courtroom).
17. People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897); People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich.
App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1979); State v. Pusch, 17 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508
(1951); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
18. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 17.
20. See Crasilneck, The Case of Dora, 23 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 95 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Crasilneck, The Case of Dora]. By playing a recording of a hyp-
notic interview in which she relived the incident, a defendant was able to show
that she had not intended to kill the deceased. It became apparent, from the tape,
that the shooting had been accidental. Id at 95-97.
21. People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963); cf.
People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366 P.2d 314 (1961) (must lay proper foundation
for expert's opinion).
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provably unreliable.22 The cases barring evidence of criminal intent
have contributed to the debate over the use of hypno-enhanced testi-
mony by evidencing a judicial skepticism over the ability of hypnosis to
meet appropriate levels of legal certainty.23 Indeed, many of the deci-
sions that have refused to admit post-hypnotic testimony have relied
upon the criminal intent cases for support.24
B. Use of Hypnosis to Refresh Recall
The widespread use of hypnosis as a crime solving tool is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon.25 The Los Angeles Police Department was
the first major law enforcement body to institutionalize its use as a
method of reviving the memories of traumatized witnesses.26 Since
that time, many police departments have followed Los Angeles' lead.
On several occasions, the results obtained have attracted nationwide
attention.27
The Chowchilla kidnapping incident is probably the most fre-
quently cited example of the spectactular results that can be obtained
by hypnotizing a forgetful eyewitness. A driver, whose fully-loaded
schoolbus had been seized by masked gunmen, was later asked to iden-
tify the kidnappers z.2 Although he claimed that he had concentrated on
22. The major problem with the use of hypnosis to determine a defendant's intent is
that, by necessity, the hypnotist is compelled to rely upon the subject's hypnotic
rendition of what occurred. And since this recall is often inaccurate, the basis of
the expert's testimony is potentially flawed. Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214
Va. 710, 716, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974); see also Cornell v. Superior Court, 52
Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974). But see Warner, The
Use of Hypnosis in the Defense of Criminal Cases, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERI-
MENTAL HYPNOSIS 417, 424-26 (1979) (generally accepted that intent testimony
may be admissible if the proper foundation is laid).
23. For a discussion of the problems associated with post-hypnotic recall, see infra
notes 61-100 and accompanying text.
24. State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 198, 644 P.2d 1266, 1284
(1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 29-30, 641 P.2d 775, 784, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 248-49, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764,
768, 770 (Minn. 1980).
25. Reiser, Hypnosis as an Aid in a Homicide Investigation, 17 AM. J. CLINICAL HYP-
NOSIS 84 (1974) (good description of how a hypnotic session is conducted); see
also M.S., Curious Case of Magnetic Detection, 1845 ST. Louis MAGNET 154
(probably the first reported use of hypnosis to uncover the identity of a "rogue"),
reprinted in Gravitz, An Early Case of Investigative Hypnosis.- A Brief Communica-
tion, 31 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 224 (1983).
26. Reiser & Neilson, Investigative Hypnosis- A Developing Specialty, 23 AM. J.
CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 75 (1980) (statistical report of results achieved by Los Ange-
les police department).
27. Hypnosis has played a role in a number of newsworthy cases including those of
Albert DeSalvo (Boston Strangler), the San Francisco cable car nymphomaniac,
and Dr. Samuel Sheppard (sensationalized homicide). E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY 105 (1979); Jenkins, Hypnosis- A New Technique in Crime Prevention,
8 STUDENT LAW. 27, 28, 33 (Apr. 1980) (use of hypnosis to solve a hit and run case
in Montgomery County, Maryland).
28. See Kroger & Douce, Forensic Uses ofHypnosis, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERI-
[Vol. 13
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memorizing the getaway vehicle's license plate number, he could not
remember it when questioned by police. After undergoing hypnosis,
the bus driver not only recalled the number and the state printed on the
plate, but he was accurate to within one digit.2 9
Recently, much of the enthusiasm and awe generated by the more
spectacular cases has begun to fade as witnesses, who have undergone
pretrial hypnosis, have been summoned into court for the purpose of
inculpating a defendant.
C Post-Hypnotic Recall in Court
The first major appellate decision on the admissibility of post-hyp-
notic recall was Harding v. State,3" a 1968 opinion of the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland. The case involved the revived memories of
a rape/attempted murder victim whose inconsistent pre-hypnotic state-
ments suggested that she was unable to develop an accurate rendition
of the source of her injuries.31 In a frequently quoted conclusion, the
appellate panel affirmed the trial judge's decision to admit the victim's
testimony because "[t]he fact that she had told different stories or had
achieved her present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the
question of the weight of the evidence which the trier of facts. . . must
decide. 32
Several states, including Florida, 33 Illinois, 34 Louisiana, 35 North
Carolina,36 North Dakota,37 Oregon, 38 and Wyoming,39 have followed
MENTAL HYPNOSIS 86, 90 (1979) (authors interviewed the bus driver) [hereinafter
cited as Kroger & Douce, Forensic Uses].
29. Id
30. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
31. The victim first claimed that she had been abducted by three males who had
raped and stabbed her. Harding, 5 Md. App. at 233, 246 A.2d at 304. She later
changed her story to reflect her having been shot, not stabbed. By the third inter-
view, she could recall the events leading up to being shot by the defendant. It was
not until after hypnosis that she was able to recall the rape. Id at 234-35, 246
A.2d. at 305.
32. Id at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
33. Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Wiley v. State, 427 So. 2d
283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). There is, however, some conflict between Florida's intermediate appellate
courts. Compare Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (first
district applies stricter standard than that applied in other districts) with Crum v.
State, 433 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (fifth district rejects limits envi-
sioned by Brown).
34. People v. Byas, 117 Ill. App. 3d 979, 453 N.E.2d 1141 (1983); People v. Gibson,
117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983).
35. State v. Moore, 432 So. 2d 209 (La. 1983); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La.
1983).
36. State v. Waters, 308 N.C. 348, 302 S.E.2d 188 (1983); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C.
96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Hunt, 64 N.C. App. 81, 306 S.E.2d 846 (1983);
State v. Peoples, 60 N.C. App. 479, 299 S.E.2d 311 (1983).
37. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983).
38. State v. Luther, 63 Or. App. 86, 663 P.2d 1261, af'd en banc, 296 Or. 1, 672 P.2d
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the Harding court's lead and have permitted witnesses to give testi-
mony based on post-hypnotic recall. In fact, throughout the 1970's it
appeared as though there would be no controversy because Harding
was the final word on the subject. For example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was so certain that questions
about the admissibility of post-hypnotic recall had been resolved that it
concluded "there is no issue about the admission of hypnotically re-
freshed evidence . . . ."' Nevertheless, only a year after the Ninth
Circuit pronounced the battle over, the first shot was fired.
The admissibility consensus that had existed throughout the 1970's
was shattered in 1980 by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In State v.
Mack,41 the court faced a factual record nearly identical to that in Har-
ding v. State. The victim, who was bleeding profusely, was admitted to
a hospital where she gave contradictory accounts of the source of her
injuries.42 It was not until she was hypnotized, though, that she
"remembered" being repeatedly stabbed by her estranged boyfriend.43
The Mack court addressed the hypnosis issue by applying a novel
approach borrowed from Greenfield v. Commonwealth," a Virginia case
involving a defendant's right to be hypnotized as a means of properly
preparing his case.45 The new standard, developed in Mack, character-
ized post-hypnotic testimony as scientific evidence and required that it
satisfy the Frye test, a rule that governs the admissibility of scientific
evidence.46 The Frye standard requires that, before the product of a
scientific process can be admitted into evidence, it must be shown that
the procedure used to generate it has become generally accepted by
members of the scientific community. 47 Since the hypnotic process re-
mains cloaked in mystery and its results are not consistently accurate,
the Mack court determined that hypnosis was unable to meet Frye's
threshold level of accuracy and, consequently, should be barred from
691 (1983); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434 (1971); State v. Jorgensen,
8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
39. Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo.
1982).
40. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979); see also Annot., 50 A.L.R. Fed. 604 (1980) (analyzes Ninth Circuit
decisions).
41. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
42. At first, the victim attributed her injuries to a consensual sexual act, but she later
claimed that they were caused by a motorcycle accident. Id at 766. The medical
personnel on duty, believing that neither of these incidents could have caused the
injuries, were persuaded that she was not giving an accurate factual account. Id
43. The apparent motive for the attack was that she had "run out" on him, a conclu-
sion that was consistent with the events preceding the attack. Id. at 767.
44. 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
45. Id For a reference to cases on this issue, see supra note 16.
46. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
47. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For an in-depth expla-
nation of the Frye test, see infra notes 130-167 and accompanying text.
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the courtroom.48
Use of the Frye test to exclude post-hypnotic testimony has had a
profound impact on the Harding-generated consensus. While some
states continue to permit the unrestrained use of this evidence, 9 Mack
has been cited in a growing number of jurisdictions which have barred
hypno-enhanced testimony."0 Indeed, the Maryland court that au-
thored Harding recently reversed itself and, relying heavily on Mack,
ruled that hypno-enhanced evidence was inadmissible. 5' This growing
exclusionary trend, however, has not gone unanswered by those who
have sought to salvage forensic hypnosis as a crime fighting tool.
The response was delivered, almost a year after Mack, by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. In State v. Hurd,52 the court affirmed
the trial judge's decision to exclude the post-hypnotic testimony of a
multiple stab wound victim.53 The appellate court, however, declined
to base its decision on Mack's per se inadmissibility standard.54 In-
stead, it designed a set of procedural regulations to govern the conduct
and memorialization of hypnotic interviews.55 The Hurd court rea-
48. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1980).
49. See supra notes 33-39.
50. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
133 (1982); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich.
App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981), affd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982);
People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
51. Maryland's courts have come full circle on the hypnosis issue. It launched the
controversy in 1968 with the Harding decision, perpetuated it with State v.
Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980), vacated on other grounds, 290
Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981), and ended it with a line of decisions beginning
with Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981) (the first Maryland
decision to apply Frye to a hypnosis case); see also Collins v. State, 52 Md. App.
186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982), aff'd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983). The Court of
Appeals, apologizing for having waited so long, finally laid the issue to rest in a
cluster of decisions authored by Judge Smith. State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 682
n.l, 464 A.2d 1028, 1034 n.l (1983); see State v. Metscher, 297 Md. 368, 464 A.2d
1052 (1983); State v. McCoy, 297 Md. 5, 464 A.2d 1067 (1983) (per curiam);
Grimes v. State, 297 Md. 1, 464 A.2d 1065 (1983); Simkus v. State, 296 Md. 718,
464 A.2d 1055 (1983). The explanation offered for the shift is that, during the
interim between Harding and Collins, Maryland's highest court adopted the Frye
test as its standard for gauging the admissibility of scientific evidence. Reed v.
State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978). For a thorough explantion of
the rules of admissibility before Reed, see Note, Voice Identification Testimony
Based on Spectrographic Analysis Inadmissible Because the Technique Has Not
Gained General Acceptance in the Scientific Community, 39 MD. L. REV. 629
(1979).
52. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
53. State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (1980), afid, 86 N.J. 525, 432
A.2d 86 (1981).
54. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94 (per se inadmissibility rule is "unnecessarily
broad").
55. Id at 545-546, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
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soned that these safeguards would reduce the likelihood that the hyp-
notic session would produce inaccurate results and would provide a
reviewable record of how the session was conducted. 56 To ensure com-
pliance, the Hurd court further provided that a post-hypnotic witness
would not be allowed to testify unless his sponsor could establish, by
clear and convincing evidence, that each of the safeguards was fol-
lowed. 7 Once these formalities were accomplished, questions over the
accuracy of the testimony were relegated to the trier of fact.5"
A notion gaining popularity is that hypnotic sessions can be struc-
tured in a manner that resolves doubts over the accuracy of post-hyp-
notic recall. Although some states have adopted the Hurd standards
verbatim,59 others have fashioned their own standards.6"
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH HYPNO-ENHANCED MEMORY
The admissibility controversy has principally centered on the in-
ability of hypnosis to produce consistently reliable results. On several
documented occasions, witnesses have undergone pretrial hypnosis
only to emerge with demonstratively false recollections. 61 While ordi-
nary eyewitness testimony is often fraught with inconsistencies, 62 hyp-
nosis increases the likelihood of false recollections and insulates these
falsities from detection. 63 Furthermore, most of the hypnotic inter-
views are conducted in less than ideal conditions' with witnesses
56. Id at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
57. Id at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97.
58. Id at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
59. See infra note 171.
60. See infra note 169.
61. People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980) (while under hypnosis, a
witness who had previously stated that it was impossible for him to see if the
accused pulled the trigger was able to recall having seen it); State v. Mack, 292
N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980) (for a list of inconsistencies, see supra note 42).
62. Grossman, Suggestive Idenifications The Supreme Court's Due Process Test Fails
to Meet Its Own Criteria, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 71-79 (1981); Kubie, Implica-
tions for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
59 (1959); Levine & Trapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification, 121 U. PA.
L. REV. 1079 (1973); Lezak, Some Psychological Limitations on Witness Reliability,
20 WAYNE L. REV. 117 (1973).
63. See infra notes 66-100 and accompanying text. Of course, not all hypnotists delib-
erately distort the memories of witnesses. Although deliberate abuse or coercive
persuasion may occur, this article is premised upon the assumption that most in-
vestigative hypnotists do not consciously attempt to alter a witness's memory. But
see Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975). At least one com-
mentator has described Emmett as a "nightmare" of abuse. Diamond, Inherent
Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 313, 325 (1980); cf. United States v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 694, 697 (S.D.
Tex. 1983) (witness declared incompetent due to an unprofessionally conducted
session); State v. Luther, 63 Or. App. 86, 663 P.2d 1261 (1983) (allegation that the
prosecutors attempted to alter a grand jury witness's testimony), aft'd en banc, 296
Or. 1, 672 P.2d 691 (1983).
64. A difference exists between the ideal conditions enjoyed by laboratory researchers
and the confused state of affairs associated with a criminal investigation. For ex-
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whose credibility is often questionable.65
In general, five identifiable problems are linked to the use of hyp-
nosis to stimulate recall: hypersuggestibility, hypercompliance, confab-
ulation, hardening, and post-hypnotic source amnesia.
A. Hypersuggesfibility
One of the most controversial features of the hypnotic trance is
that it lowers the subject's ability to analyze critically incoming infor-
mation.66 While this lowering of sensory barriers permits the hypnotist
to probe sensitive memories, it also increases the likelihood that the
subject will adopt a response suggested by the hypnotist.67 After the
session, not only does the subject subscribe to the accuracy of the
adopted responses with a heightened sense of conviction, but experts
are unable to detect whether the witness is testifying from suggested or
actual recal. 68 Suggestions can be made as overtly as a detective lean-
ing over an entranced witness and demanding, "Was it Paul?,"6 9 or as
subtly as a failed pre-hypnotic photo identification session.7° Calhoun
ample, victims and witnesses experience a greater pressure to remember than do
those involved in laboratory testing. See Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal
Investigation, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 358, 366 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Kroger & Douce, Criminal Investigation ].
65. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980) (victim's recall clouded
because she was intoxicated when the crime occurred); State v. McQueen, 295
N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978) (key witness, who had been a fugitive during the
four year period between the incident and the session, was offered immunity to
inculpate the defendant); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d
170 (198 1) (three years after an unsolved murder, an admitted user of hallucino-
genic drugs gave a statement to police officers because she was having frequent
nightmares about the unsolved crime).
66. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERI-
MENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 326 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Orne, Hypnosis in Court];
see State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (loss of critical judgment was
important because it materially contributed to the likelihood that the subject
would adopt speculative information that he would have otherwise questioned).
67. Responses can be overtly suggested in two primary ways: false premise suggestion
and leading questions. Comment, Hypnosis-Its Role and Current Admissibility in
the CriminalLaw, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 665, 672-73 (1981). False premise sugges-
tion involves the placement of a false factual assumption in the subject's mind.
For example, while a person would not take money from a stranger's coat, the
hypnotist could overcome this obstacle by suggesting that the coat belonged to the
subject. Id ; see also Orne, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 66, at 332 (examples of
how a leading question can affect recall).
68. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
69. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 531, 432 A.2d 86, 89 (1981); see also Commonwealth v.
Brouillet, 389 Mass. 605, 451 N.E.2d 128 (1983) (suspect's photograph shown to
subject while the witness was under hypnosis).
70. State v. Metscher, 297 Md. 368, 370-71, 464 A.2d 1052, 1053 (1983) (at show-up,
the victim stated that he could not be sure); Simkus v. State, 296 Md. 718, 722, 464
A.2d 1055, 1058 (1983) (witness only 90% positive at photograph session). Some
authorities even posit that the location of the interview can induce recall of infor-
mation favorable to the prosecution. People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145,
155, 310 N.W.2d 306, 311 (1981) (criticizing Harding because the session was held
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v. State,7 a 1983 decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, exem-
plifies the latter.
In Calhoun, Douglas Cummins, the only survivor of a robbery,
was shown an array of photographs in an effort to ascertain the identity
of the perpetrators. Although Cummins pointed out Calhoun's photo-
graph and exclaimed, "that's who I'd put my money on,"72 he was un-
able to express confidence in his choice because the robbers had worn
nylon stocking masks. In a candid remark, the witness revealed to the
investigator conducting the session that he had selected Calhoun's pho-
tograph because "the shape of the head was similar. '7 3 After undergo-
ing hypnosis, the doubts Cummins expressed at the photographic
session evaporated as he positively identified the defendant at trial.74 A
logical explanation for this heightened level of confidence is that Cum-
mins had subconsciously adopted the character whose photograph he
had selected at the photographic session.
B. Hypercompliance
To probe the sensitive areas of an individual's memory, it is essen-
tial that the hypnotist establish a good rapport with the subject.75 This
trusting relationship has led several commentators to assert that sub-
jects often feel a strong desire to "remember" events that will please the
hypnotist, regardless of whether the events recalled actually occurred.7 6
at the police barracks), afl'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980) (discussion of event with friends, police,
and physicians may have colored victim's rendition of facts).
71. 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983).
72. Id. at 575, 468 A.2d at 50.
73. Id. For a copy of the interviewing officer's notes, see Joint Record Extract Vol. III
at 424, Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983).
74. The court of appeals, affirming the defendant's conviction, found that the wit-
ness's memory was not enhanced because he had been able to identify the de-
fendant at the photograph session. Calhoun, 297 Md. at 577-78, 468 A.2d at 5 i.
Inexplicably, however, the court chose not to address the witness's reason for be-
ing uncertain about the defendant's identity: the accused had been wearing a
mask. Since the witness could not see through the mask, it remains unclear how
he acquired the ability to positively identify an individual based solely on the
shape of his head.
75. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 64, 641 P.2d 775, 802-03, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
271, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982). In Hurd, the court explained "[tihe
hypnotist first establishes a rapport with the subject and creates a passiveness that
will make the subject receptive to suggestions." State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 534,
432 A.2d 86, 90 (1981); see Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 104, 436
A.2d 170, 174 (1981); see also Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic State-
ments." Is the Law of Evidence SusceptibleZ 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 567, 571 (1977) (de-
tailing the importance of establishing rapport).
76. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 184, 644 P.2d 1266, 1270
(1982) (anxious to assist police in apprehending suspect); Commonwealth v.
Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983) (hypnotized persons tend to become
attuned to the hypnotist); see also Kroger & Douce, Criminal Investigation, supra
note 64, at 365 (subject's view of how a hypnotized person should act can be
decisively suggestive).
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This complaint has been expanded to support the argument that since
the subject is aware that the purpose of the session is to identify the
person who caused the trauma, the subject will be induced to create a
memory that will satisfy the probing hypnotist.77 At least one commen-
tator has attributed the Harding victim's testimony to a desire to re-
member information favorable to the state.78 Since the victim was
aware that a suspect had been apprehended, it is conceivable that she
remembered information that would confirm her suspicions and incul-
pate the individual who had subjected her to a horrifying experience.7 9
C. Confabulation
Confabulation occurs when a person under hypnosis invents a
memory that did not exist prior to the session.8" It is an interesting
aspect of the hypnosis debate because it reflects how little science
knows about the affect hypnosis has on the human mind. The phenom-
enon is distinguishable from hypersuggestibility because it is the sub-
ject, and not an external source, who causes memories to become
altered. The process occurs deliberately or unconsciously, and it can be
virtually undetectable. 81
The ability to consciously manufacture memory, otherwise known
as fraud or deceit, is not affected by the hypnotic trance.82 Thus, the
77. Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); State v. Mack,
292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97,
104, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981) (desire to please coupled with awareness of the
purpose of the session).
78. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIo N.U.L.
REV. 1, 19 (1977).
79. Id.
80. Since hypnosis reduces an individual's critical judgment, supra note 66, hypnotic
subjects are more likely to fantasize answers when there are no existing memories
to draw upon. See generally Diamond, supra note 63, at 316, 335-36. A contem-
porary branch of this phenomenon has developed over the use of hypnosis to
create historic projections. Historic projection involves the use of hypnosis to per-
mit a subject to recall a previous life by aiding him in "remembering" a prior life.
See M. BERNSTEIN, THE SEARCH FOR BRIDEY MURPHY (1956) (chronicle of a
woman who could remember her prior life). Historic projection has recently been
explained as an example of the types of fantasies that can evolve during a hyp-
notic session. Baker, The Effect of Suggestion on Past Lives Regression, 25 AM. J.
CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 71, 75 (1982). Dr. Orne argues that this type of confabula-
tion also occurs when hypnosis is used to refresh a witness's memory. Orne, Hyp-
nosis in Court, supra note 66, at 332.
81. Worthington, The Use in Court of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 27 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 402, 414 (1979) (virtually impossible to
distinguish confabulated memories from actual recall); see Diamond, supra note
63, at 333-34 (subjects are generally unable to sort fantasized memories from ac-
tual recall).
82. Spector & Foster, supra note 75, at 594; see Orne, Hypnosis in Court, supra note
66, at 333-34 (example of victim who lied convincingly under hypnosis); see also
State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272 (1982)
(purposeful lying is a problem with post-hypnotic recall); People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 31-32, 641 P.2d 775, 782, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 250 (reference to expert
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popular belief that hypnosis renders a subject incapable of lying is un-
founded. In addition, most experts agree that it is not possible to ascer-
tain whether an individual is actually under hypnosis; a trance can be
feigned without detection.8 3
People v. Lopez,84 a 1980 Court of Appeal of California decision,
provides a good example of a witness who was able to lie, even though
she was hypnotized. The issue arose when a victim was confronted in
court with a number of discrepancies in her post-hypnotic rendition of
a sexual assault. Several explanations were offered, such as that she
feared the defendants would retaliate, she was embarrassed about the
nature of the acts committed on her, and she was apprehensive about
her parents discovering that she was sexually active. To establish this
rehabilitating factor, the prosecution presented a physician who testi-
fied that "a person in a state of hypnosis is able to lie, and will lie for
the same reasons he would lie in a non-hypnotic condition."85
Unconscious memory alteration is a more difficult phenomenon to
detect. Experts state that the human memory is not a videotape of
everything which occurred in the witness's immediate proximity. A
momentary turn of the head or an undigested perception can create
gaps in the recollection of an incident.86 Once under hypnosis, the
mind's logical completion mechanism fills the gaps with what it be-
lieves must have occurred.87 The confabulated response, like a missing
puzzle piece, often fits into the existing memory so well that it is virtu-
ally undetectable. 8 State v. Hurd illustrates the process by which the
witness who commented upon the subject's ability to be dishonest), cert. denied
103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
83. Diamond, supra note 63, at 336-37; Orne, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 66, at
313. Some tests, however, can detect the presence of hypnosis. See Spiegel, supra
note 6, at 80; see also Spector & Foster, supra note 75, at 575-76; Comment, supra
note 67, at 670-7 1.
84. 110 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 168 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1980).
85. Id. at 1017, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The victim was engaged in sexual intercourse
with her boyfriend when the defendants discovered them. The victim was bru-
tally raped and her boyfriend was beaten to death. To avoid disclosure of the
incident, the victim invented an incredible story about an obese man in an auto-
mobile. This rendition was so inaccurate that even the hypnotists concluded that
it was a lie. Id
86. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 184-85, 644 P.2d 1266, 1270-
71 (1982) (hypnosis cannot aid in the pursuit of truth when perception or registra-
tion is not present); see Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 111, 436 A.2d
170, 177 (1981) (witness had been using hallucinogenic drugs); State v. Long, 32
Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982) (potentially corroborrating witnesses were
looking the other way when the crime occurred).
87. People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 152-53 n.4, 310 N.W.2d 306, 310 n.4
(1981) (excerpt from an affidavit Dr. Martin Ore filed in an unreported Califor-
nia case), afid, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 768 (Minn. 1980) (due to a perceived need to fill gaps in memory, subject will
rarely respond, "I don't know"); Orne, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 66, at 317.
88. Worthington, supra note 8 1, at 414. The author explains that confabulated mem-
ories are "eminently plausible." Id Thus, this makes it virtually impossible for
even a highly trained expert to discover confabulations. Id
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logical completion mechanism can operate to alter recall.
In Hurd, the victim was alleged to have confabulated at least one
response. When asked if her former husband had remarried, rather
than denying knowledge of his marital status, she responded that he
was still single.89 A subsequent investigation, however, revealed that
he had remarried. The victim merely fabricated a plausible memory to
fill a gap in her actual recall."
D. Hardening
When a hypnotic session ends and the subject emerges from the
trance, a subjective conviction often attaches to the accuracy of the res-
urrected memories.9' This heightened conviction applies to all memo-
ies, whether they are the product of improperly suggested responses or
confabulation.92 Indeed, one writer has stated that "hypnosis is the in-
duction of conviction."93 The practical legal impact of the hardening
process is that, after hypnosis, a doubting witness becomes an "unshak-
able" witness.94
89. State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 348-49, 414 A.2d 291, 299 (1980), af'd, 86 N.J.
525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (expert testimony pointing out several possible examples
of confabulation). The lower court's opinion extensively reviewed the expert testi-
mony offered by the litigants. Dr. Martin Orne, whose conclusions were reprinted
at some length, cited several examples of how the improperly conducted session
could have influenced the victim's present recollections. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. at
343-49, 414 A.2d at 296-99.
90. See also Karlin, Forensic Hypnosis." Two Case Reports, 31 INT'L J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 227 (1983) (author notes examples of confabulation in
two cases).
91. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981) (pre-
hypnosis uncertainties become molded into certitude); see, e.g., Harker v. State, 55
Md. App. 460, 463 A.2d 288, cert. denied, 297 Md. 312 (1983). The witness testi-
fied "[b]elieving that on the final day God will be my judge and all the Saints my
jury, there stands the man who tried to murder me." Harker, 55 Md. App. at 466-
67, 463 A.2d at 292; Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536, 447 N.E.2d 1182
(1983) (court affirmatively found that witness's confidence had been enhanced);
see also Sheehan & Tilden, Effects of Suggestibility and Hypnosis on Accurate and
Distorted Retrievalfrom Memory, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING,
MEMORY & COGNITION 283, 292 (1983) (study of how hypersuggestion and hard-
ening coalesce to conceal inaccurate recall).
92. Dr. Orne states that "[u]nfortunately, a witness who is uncertain about his recall
of a particular set of events can, with hypnosis, be helped to have absolute subjec-
tive conviction about what had happened, though the certainty can as easily relate
to a confabulation as to an actual memory." People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App.
145, 152 n.4, 310 N.W.2d 306, 310 n.4 (1981) (excerpt from an affidavit submitted
in an unreported California case), aft'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982);
see State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980) (post-hypnotic witness able
to pass a lie detector test even though memories were false).
93. Kroger & Douce, Forensic Uses, supra note 28, at 87.
94. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 n.10 (Minn. 1980) (affidavit of Dr. Orne); see
also Alderman & Barrette, Hypnosis on Trial A Practical Perspective on the Appli-
cation of Forensic Hypnosis in Criminal Cases, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 27 (1982) (con-
ceivable that judges and juries will ignore important issues because post-hypnotic
recall is so convincing).
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One commentator has interpreted the Maryland court of special
appeals' unquestioning acceptance of the rape victim's testimony in
Harding v. State as an illustration of the impact subjective conviction-
engendered hypnosis can have on the judicial system. This author con-
cluded that the Harding court fell into the "trap" created by the con-
vincing nature of the victim's testimony.95
E Post-Hypnotic Source Amnesia
An individual who has undergone hypnosis may have no recollec-
tion of either the session or the source of newly created memories.9 6
Instead, the subject assumes that all present memory is genuine." Col-
lier v. State9 8 contains an example of witnesses who were unable to
recall having been hypnotized. Although a sheriffs deputy hypnotized
most of them before trial, none of the witnesses could recall ever hav-
ing been hypnotized.99 Thus, the evidence was admitted because the
court assumed it represented present recall, even though it might have
been influenced by the hypnotic process.1°°
IV. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: SEARCH FOR A
STANDARD
The judicial treatment of hypnosis generally depends upon how
different jurisdictions have chosen to characterize it, and once labeled,
which evidentiary rules should govern its admissibility. At the center
of the controversy is the difficult task of deciding who should resolve
the reliability problems associated with the revived memories: the jury,
the experts, or the trial judge.
95. Dilloff, supra note 78, at 22.
96. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 272 (self
deception is enhanced because the subject is unable to recall the session), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 156-57, 310 N.W.2d 306, 312
(198 1) (inability to remember the session may occur either naturally or as a result
of post-hypnotic suggestion), a f'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); Com-
ment, The Probative Value of Testimonyfrom Hypnotically Refreshed Recollection,
14 AKRON L. REV. 609, 611 (1981) (while amnesia is not an essential element, it is
very common).
97. The major problem associated with an inability to recall the source of manufac-
tured recall is that the subject will unknowingly assume that all present memories
reflect actual experiences. People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 156-57, 310
N.W.2d 306, 312 (1981), a ffd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); Diamond,
supra note 63, at 333-35; Comment, supra note 96, at 621.
98. 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
99. Collier, 244 Ga. at 557, 261 S.E.2d at 370.
100. Id at 559, 261 S.E.2d at 371; see also Stewart v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 1982)
(dictum) (court believed witness's statement that hypnosis had not helped him).
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A. The Open Door-Let the Jury Decide
The rule that Maryland conceived in Harding v. State 101 is proba-
bly the easiest scheme to understand and implement. It regards post-
hypnotic recall as ordinary eyewitness testimony because it is
presented, with all its faults, to the jury. It is the jury's responsibility to
assign it the appropriate weight. 02 The precise evidentiary foundation
that sponsors of a hypno-enhanced witness must lay is the subject of
some dispute. Some jurisdictions do not require any expert testimony
concerning the hypnotic process; instead, they assign to the defendant
the burden and expense of raising the hypnosis issue. °3 In the Ninth
Circuit, for example, there is "no need for a foundation concerning the
nature and effects of hypnosis."' ° Others argue that only through a
battle of the experts will the strengths and weaknesses of the hypnotic
process be fully revealed to the trier of fact.'° 5 Also, assigning the bur-
den of raising the hypnosis issue to the defendant places him in the
uneasy position of having to raise an issue that could have negative
ramifications. 0 6
101. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
102. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974); Harding, 5
Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306; State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423, 436 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. McQueen,
295 N.C. 96, 119, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9,
492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971).
103. The burden of raising the issue is on the defendant and, whether by tactical choice
or by oversight, a failure to raise the hypnosis issue, either by a motion in limine or
by cross examination, is a waiver of the right to contest the issue on appeal. Nor-
wood v. State, 55 Md. App. 503, 506, 462 A.2d 93, 95 (1983); State v. MfcQueen,
295 N.C. 96, 119, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978); State v. Luther, 296 Or. 1, 672 P.2d
691 (1983) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 178-79, 439
A.2d 805, 809 (1982); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1981).
104. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979).
105. The exchange of the expert testimony ventilates the hypnosis issue, arguably to
the point of remedying problems with cross examination. Dilloff, supra note 78, at
22-23 (cautionary instruction, expert testimony, and cross examination); Com-
ment, Safeguards Against Suggestiveness: A Means for Admissibility of Hypno-In-
duced Testimony, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197, 203-04 (1981); see also State v.
Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 904-05 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (evidentiary founda-
tion must include the testimony of the examining hypnotist); cf. Collier v. State,
244 Ga. 553, 558, 261 S.E.2d 364, 370 (1979) (order denying cross examination on
the subject of post-hypnotic recall overly broad), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980);
State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (burden on the party who
proposes to use hypnotically stimulated testimony), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2125
(1983).
106. The defendant is placed in the uneasy position of having to choose between waiv-
ing his right to challenge the witness's competency, supra note 103, and raising an
issue which could easily make the witness more credible in the view of the jury.
See infra notes 140-42 & 153 and accompanying text. But see State v. Armstrong,
110 Wis. 2d 555, 573, 329 N.W.2d 386, 395 (problem resolved by requiring the
state to show, at a pretrial conference, that the session was not suggestive; once the
judge finds that no improper suggestions were made at the hypnotic session, the
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The underlying assumption behind admitting hypno-enhanced re-
call with little or no evidentiary foundation is that jurors are presumed
to be capable of detecting faulty memory once the entire process is ex-
posed to them. io7 As one judge observed, "I am firmly of the belief that
jurors are quite capable of seeing through flaky testimony and psuedo-
scientific clap-trap."' 8 In addition, the likelihood that the proffered
testimony might be inaccurate is ignored because the factual accuracy
of evidence has never been a precondition to its admissibility.0 9
The centerpiece of the full exposure approach is the adversary sys-
tem. "o A recurring theme in the decisions that follow Harding is that,
since the witness and the hypnotist were exposed to prolonged and vig-
orous cross examination, flaws in the witness's testimony will be un-
earthed and willful abuse will be deterred."' Before allowing this
adversarial exchange, most courts have required that the use of pre-
trial hypnosis as a memory stimulus be disclosed to opposing counsel,
regardless of whether this information has been requested in
discovery. 112
defendant must raise the hypnosis issue at trial), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2125
(1983).
107. People v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983); Spector & Foster,
supra note 75, at 595 (law generally proceeds upon the assumption that jurors are
endowed with a sufficient degree of sophistication to choose the "permissible" use
of an evidentiary item); Comment, supra note 67, at 675 (since jurors can compre-
hend the frailties of ordinary eyewitness recall, they can readily recognize the fal-
libility of hypnotic recollections).
108. People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 928, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1982)
(Gardner, J., concurring).
109. People v. Gibson, 117 I11. App. 3d 270, 276, 452 N.E.2d 1368, 1373 (1983) (no
reason to treat post-hypnotic recall any differently that other eyewitness testi-
mony); Spector & Foster, supra note 75, at 584; Comment, The Admissibility of
Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1218 (1981) (demanding
infallibility from post-hypnotic recall is inconsistent with the general rules of evi-
dence that permit unreliable eyewitnesses to testify).
110. Some hypnosis advocates have taken impassioned views of the role of the adver-
sary system. Representative of these views is the following statement: "[t]he final
arbiter of truth and accuracy is the trier of fact . . . . In the final analysis, man
must judge man, and the role of science should be subordinated to the human
adversary system of justice when life, liberty and property are at stake." Dilloff,
supra note 78, at 23.
111. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974); People v.
Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 277-78, 452 N.E.2d 1368, 1374 (1983); Peterson v.
State, 448 N.E.2d 673, 680 (Ind. 1983) (Hunter, J., concurring) (clarified an ambig-
uously written majority opinion); State v. Moore, 432 So. 2d 209, 214 (La. 1983)
(vigorous cross examination will reveal any defect which hypnosis might have had
on memory); State v. Peoples, 60 N.C. App. 479, 483, 299 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1983);
State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 7, 492 P.2d 312, 314-15 (1971) (vigorous cross
examination of witness and experts); see also United States v. Narcisco, 446 F.
Supp. 252, 282 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (vigorous cross examination can cure defects in
an unconstitutionally suggestive identification).
112. The cases reference Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 0963), a decision that man-
dated the disclosure of material exculpatory information. And because undergo-
ing hypnosis affects the subject's credibility, its use must be disclosed even when
not requested in discovery. United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 828-31 (2d Cir.
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Supporters of the Harding rule have also relied upon the liberal
rules of admissibility that control witness competency and present rec-
ollection refreshed. Under the heading of witness competency, some
courts contend that banning post-hypnotic testimony is functionally
equivalent to declaring the witness incompetent." 3 This "tortured"
reading of witness competency is inconsistent with the accepted rule
that a witness need only be able to express himself and understand his
obligation to tell the truth." 4 The proclaimed injustice associated with
a total ban on post-hypnotic recall is that an otherwise competent wit-
ness, often the only inculpating eyewitness, is prevented from
testifying. 115
An analogy drawn to present recollection refreshed has also been
used to support the unquestioned admission of hypnotically generated
testimony.1 6 Proponents of this view assume that, at trial, the post-
hypnotic witness is testifying from present memory which has merely
been revived by hypnosis.' '7 Once this assumption has been made, it is
relatively simple to admit the testimony because of the liberal rules
1969); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025, 1039-42 (N.D. Ga. 1975); People v.
Angelini, 649 P.2d 341 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Luther, 63 Or. App. 86, 663
P.2d 1261, afden banc, 296 Or. 1, 672 P.2d 691 (1983); see also Commonwealth v.
Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983) (because the hypnosis issue must be
raised before trial, opposing counsel is expected to make a voluntary disclosure).
But see State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 335 N.W.2d 542 (1983) (no need to disclose
aborted attempt to hypnotize the victim); cf. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 547 n.6,
432 A.2d 86, 97 n.6 (1981) (at minimum, videotape should be disclosed so that
opposing counsel can prepare challenges).
113. See, e.g., Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (diffexence
between credibility and competency); Morgan v. State, 445 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (procedural flaws in session affect credibility, not competency).
114. Under the accepted rules of competency, all a witness need show is a first-hand
observation of the event in question and demonstrate a capacity to understand the
ability to tell the truth. FED. R. EVID. 601, 602. Based on this liberal standard,
post-hypnotic recall has been admitted because it is believed to represent the wit-
ness's present recall. Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.
1975), and the witness is capable of offering evidence of probative value. People
v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979); State v. Brown,
337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983); Comment, The Admissibility of Polygraph and
Hypnotic Evidence to Test the Credibility of a Witness, 97 DET. C.L. REV. 97, 123-
24 (1982). A problem identified with this concept is that often the only way to
determine whether a hypnotized individual has witnessed an event first-hand is to
accept unquestioningly the subject's post-hypnotic statement to that effect. See
Note, Evidence-Admissibilit of Present Recollection Restored by Hypnosis-
State v. McQueen, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 357, 368-69 (1979) (only evidence
that witness was present at the time of a shooting was her post-hypnotic claim).
115. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 149 (N.D. 1983).
116. Eg., State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-22, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-29 (1978); Com-
ment, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Induced Recollection, 70 KY. L.J. 187, 192-
94 (1981).
117. See Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974); Clark v.
State, 379 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 386-88, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853-55 (1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C.
96, 122, 244 S.E.2d 414, 429 (1978).
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governing the method by which present recollection may be re-
freshed. ' As Judge Moylan of the Maryland court of special appeals
observed, "anything which produces the desired testimonial prelude,
'[i]t all comes back to me now,'" can be used." 9
The simplistic approach taken by supporters of the Harding rule
has led many to criticize its underlying assumptions. The most often
voiced complaint is that Harding's reliance on the adversary system is
misplaced because witnesses who have undergone pretrial hypnosis
cannot be effectively cross examined. 20 The obstacle to cross examina-
tion is the hardening process which masks the flaws and doubts which
can often plague ordinary memory.' 2 ' The witness, often unaware that
hypnosis has even taken place, convincingly testifies about his present
recollections, regardless of whether they include confabulated and sug-
gested responses.' 22 At the very least, this development reveals a
fundamental flaw in the observation that the rules governing present
recollection refreshed will adequately protect against the problems as-
sociated with hypno-enhanced testimony. Under those rules, the only
way to determine whether a memorandum has actually refreshed a wit-
ness's memory is to cross examine his statements to that effect. 123 Since
118. The McQueen court cited Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1926),
for the proposition that "[i]t is quite immaterial by what means memory is quick-
ened; it may be a song, or a face, or a newspaper item, or a writing of some
character. It is sufficient that by some mental operation, however mysterious, the
memory is stimulated to recall the event." McQueen, 295 N.C. at 122, 244 S.E.2d
at 429. The only two safeguards offered by the rules governing present recollec-
tion refreshed are one, that the judge must find that the memory has, in fact, been
refreshed and, two, that the witness's resurrected recall be tested by the adversary
system. Some commentators maintain that these measures will adequately ensure
the reliability of post-hypnotic recall. Comment, supra note 116, at 192-94; Com-
ment, Refreshing the Memory of a Witness Through Hypnosis, 5 U.C.L.A.
[UCLA]-ALASKA L. REV. 266, 268-69 (1976).
119. Baker v. State, 35 Md. App. 593, 603, 371 A.2d 699, 705 (1977).
120. Post-hypnotic witnesses are considered immune from cross examination because
they assume that present memories are genuine and they repeat potentially inac-
curate information with a high degree of conviction. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226,
230, 624 P.2d 1274, 1278 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65-66, 641 P.2d
775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 272, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); People v.
Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 712 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Gonzales, 108
Mich. App. 145, 160, 310 N.W.2d 306, 314 (1981), aff'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329
N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 215-16, 313 N.W.2d 648, 653
(1981). Even when new information is not produced by the hypnotic session, the
witness's rendition of pre-hypnotic facts becomes fixed and cross examination can
be impaired. Orne, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 66, at 332.
121. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
122. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 641 P.2d 775, 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 394, 427 A.2d
1041, 1048 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980); State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536-37, 432 A.2d 86, 91-92 (1981).
123. Baker v. State, 35 Md. App. 593, 600, 371 A.2d 699, 703 (1977) (citing United
States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1949); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 19 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)).
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hypno-enhanced recall is exempt from such an inquiry, the rules of
present recollection refreshed are of limited use.
In addition to these flaws in Harding's underlying reasoning, the
immunity from cross examination raises a myriad of constitutional is-
sues. "'24 Most notably, an increasing number of authorities are begin-
ning to recognize that the use of pretrial hypnosis may deprive
defendants of their constitutional right to confront opposing wit-
nesses. 25 On several occasions, the Supreme Court has gone beyond
merely requiring cross examination and has dictated that according the
accused anything less than meaningful cross examination constitutes
reversible error. 2 If hypnosis insulates testimony from cross examina-
tion, it is fairly simple to understand why this development could im-
pede any effort to achieve meaningful cross examination of the
memories on which that testimony is based. Also, since the recollection
of an incriminating state witness may be permanently altered under
hypnosis, constitutional protections relating to suggestive identifica-
tions,127 when counsel must be present,128 and destruction of material
124. Some dispute exists over whether constitutional problems would arise in a civil
context. Compare Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, 430 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (La.
Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing constitutional due process right) with People v.
Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 542, 453 N.E.2d 484, 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 265 (1983)
(constitutional restrictions do not apply in a civil context). See generally Alder-
man & Barrette, supra note 94, at 5 (good discussion of methods used to mount
various constitutional attacks on post-hypnotic testimony).
125. United States v. Charles, 561 F.2d 694, 698 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (sixth amendment
confrontation right contravened by an unduly suggestive session); State ex rel
Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 187-89, 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-75 (1982);
Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Ind. 1983). The Court of Appeals of New
York has attempted to fashion a three part standard for evaluating the confronta-
tion problem. This standard analyzes: (1) the individual's belief in the ability of
hypnosis to yield the truth; (2) the degree to which he has been hypnotized (level
of trance); and (3) the extent to which those administering the hypnosis observed
the standards recommended by the experts. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523,
546, 453 N.E.2d 484, 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 267 (1983). Bul see State v. Arm-
strong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 569-70, 329 N.W.2d 386, 393-94 (cross examination and
use of expert testimony solves constitutional problem), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2125 (1983).
126. The purpose behind the constitutional right to cross examination is to accord ju-
rors the opportunity to judge witness demeanor. Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); see Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
127. In a more limited context, the suggestive nature of post-hypnotic identifications
has been argued. People v. Byas, 117 Ii. App. 3d 979, 453 N.E.2d 1141 (1983)
(dictum); Peterson v. State, 445 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983); Alderman & Barrett,
supra note 94, at 11-12; Comment, supra note 109, at 1218-19. The major problem
with raising this issue as a defense is that the burden of proving impermissible
suggestion is on the party contesting the issue; after a session has passed muster
under the evidentiary rules, it is unlikely that the defendant will be able to dis-
cover enough evidence to prevail on a constitutional challenge. See State v. Hurd,
86 N.J. 525, 548, 432 A.2d 86, 97-98 (1981). But see State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis.
2d 555, 571, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394 (party seeking to present post-hypnotic testi-
mony has initial burden of proving that the session was not suggestive), cert. de-
19831
Baltimore Law Review
evidence 129 may be implicated as well. As a result of these evidentiary
and constitutional problems, a growing number of jurisdictions have
decided to reject the Harding rule in favor of more restrictive admissi-
bility standards.
B. The Frye-Test-Let the Experts Decide
Maryland, 3 ° along with several other states,' 3 ' has recently re-
jected the Harding approach by labeling post-hypnotic testimony as
scientific evidence and excluding it under the Frye test.'32 Under this
test, scientific evidence cannot be admitted until the procedures by
which it was obtained earn the general acceptance of their respective
scientific communities. 133 The experts who make up the scientific com-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983). For authority defining the constitutional limitations
on suggestive eyewitness identification, see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1977); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); see generaly Grossman, supra note
62, at 53 (application of constitutional standards to suggestive identifications).
128. Due to the inherently suggestive nature of hypnosis and the likelihood of confab-
ulated memories, its pretrial use to identify the defendant can be more prejudicial
than conventional identification procedures. Alderman & Barrett, supra note 94,
at 15-16. In addition, the memories are fixed and thus opposing counsel is unable
to challenge them as he would an ordinary eyewitness identification. Id at 16.
Contra People v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983); People v.
Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979) (no right to counsel
at the investigatory stage because proceedings had not been initiated against de-
fendant). The right to counsel attaches at a "critical stage," a point reached when
counsel's absence might "derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-13 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
226 (1967).
129. People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980) (tampering with evi-
dence material to the defendant's guilt by conducting an improperly suggestive
hypnotic session constitutes prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Long, 32 Wash.
App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982) (improper session "deprived the defendant of a
material witness who cannot be rehabilitated"); Worthington, supra note 81, at
414-15.
130. While Harding propelled Maryland to the forefront of the admissibility contro-
versy, recent decisions of Maryland's highest court have repudiated Harding's per
se admissibility rule. State v. Metscher, 297 Md. 368, 464 A.2d 1052 (1983); State
v. McCoy, 297 Md. 5, 464 A.2d 1067 (1983) (per curiam); Grimes v. State, 297
Md. 1,464 A.2d 1065 (1983); Simkus v. State, 296 Md. 718, 464 A.2d 1055 (1983);
State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983). For a history of the state's
intermediate appellate decisions, see supra note 51. Maryland's reversal on the
admissibility issue has been cited as support for the applicability of the Frye test.
State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 197, 644 P.2d 1266, 1283
(1982); People v. Shirley, 131 Cal. 3d 18, 38, 641 P.2d 775, 792, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
261, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
131. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
133 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); Peo-
ple v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764 (Minn. 1980); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Com-
monwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
132. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
133. Id
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munity are regarded as the "scientific jury" and, before the evidence
may be admitted, they must determine that the process has evolved
beyond the experimental state and progressed to a point where it is
generally accepted as being capable of producing reliable results. 134 If
they are deadlocked, the process must await a favorable consensus
before it can reenter the courtroom.
The major reason for conditioning the admissibility of scientific
evidence on a favorable review by the scientific jury is that the experts,
and not the jurors, are better equipped to deal with the sophisticated
concepts involved.'35 Furthermore, general principles of fairness man-
date that, before a defendant should be required to shoulder the burden
and expense of challenging a scientific product, he should be entitled to
have the experts that compose the relevant scientific community pass
judgment upon its reliability.'36 These principles assume added
dimensions when dealing with hypnosis. The elusive nature of the re-
sults achieved by hypnosis keeps them locked inside the witness's mind
where their reliability cannot be objectively tested. While some have
responded that corroboration is an effective method to test the accuracy
of post-hypnotic recall, 137 no method exists for verifying the accuracy
of incriminating memories recalled under hypnosis. 38 Merely because
a witness is able to recall some details accurately does not guarantee
that others have not been confabulated. 39
134. In general, the scientific jury is comprised of disinterested experts who are knowl-
edgeable in the particular scientific specialty. They must decide whether the pro-
cedure has a sufficient scientific basis to produce reasonably uniform and reliable
results that will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. For excel-
lent examples of how this test has been applied in hypnosis cases, see State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 196-99, 644 P.2d 1266, 1285-88 (1982);
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 54-66, 641 P.2d 775, 796-804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
265-72, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
135. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Frye test assures
that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method will
have the determinative voice"); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 3 86-87, 391 A.2d 364,
370-71 (1978).
136. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364, 369-70 (1978).
137. Some courts have argued that a wealth of corroborating evidence would ade-
quately resolve the reliability problems. People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379,
388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 854-55 (1979); State v. Moore, 432 So. 2d 209, 214-15 (La.
1983); State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 576, 414 A.2d 240, 243-44 (1980),
vacated on other grounds, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981).
138. Comment, supra note 96, at 621 (cannot verify the accuracy of a hypnosis en-
hanced identification). In cases where the victim accurately recalls many sur-
rounding details, there is still no guarantee that the victim has not confabulated
the identity of the defendant. In Hurd, for example, the only evidence linking the
defendant to the crime was the victim's post-hypnotic recall. Jenkins, supra note
27, at 28.
139. An exception to the Frye standard has been developed, in other contexts, to han-
dle situations when the evidence is undeniably correct, regardless of general ac-
ceptance. See People v. Milone, 43 IlI. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976) (bite
marks). When corroborating evidence demonstrably confirms a post-hypnotic
identification of the defendant, the identification may be worthy of admission.
19831
Baltimore Law Review
The inability of jurors to evaluate post-hypnotic testimony has
also produced allegations that the use of this evidence unfairly
prejudices the jury against the defendant. Of primary concern is the
likelihood that jurors subscribe to the popular misconception that hyp-
notized people cannot lie. 14 0 This misconception is aggravated by char-
acterizing hypnosis as a scientific process because this label tends to
link hypnosis to the therapeutical and mathematical infallibility associ-
ated with other scientific and medical procedures.' 4 '
When all of these problems are combined, the result is that the
misleading aura of certainty and the inability of defense counsel to ex-
pose its flaws under cross examination combine to sway the trier of fact
in the prosecution's favor. Lastly, due to the serious crimes ordinarily
present in hypnosis cases, the prospect of lengthy incarceration based
on fantasized memories calls for a cautious approach to the admissibil-
ity question.
In addition to these areas of concern, various general policy con-
siderations argue in favor of applying the Frye test to hypnosis cases.
Most notably, the standard conserves scarce judicial resources. Under
ideal conditions, once a scientific procedure has been passed upon by
the scientific community, questions of admissibility should not arise
again until the process has undergone further refinement.'42 The po-
tential for duplicitous litigation is especially great when dealing with
post-hypnotic testimony. Since "[t]he induced recall . . . is dependent
upon and cannot be disassociated from the underlying scientific
method,"' 43 litigants in jurisdictions which follow the Harding court's
approach will not only have to challenge the credibility of the individ-
ual witness, but they will also have to contest the reliability of the hyp-
notic process. Accordingly, the trial will almost certainly "degenerate
into a trial of the technique itself.' Compounding this problem is
the probability that juries would arrive at inconsistent verdicts, even
See State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 576, 414 A.2d 240, 244 (1980), vacated on
other grounds, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981) (rape victim able to recall a
unique white spot on her attacker's body).
140. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 186, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272
(1982) (typical jurors will give it undue weight); People v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d
522, 531, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386, 391 (1980) (jurors may be tempted to view the hyp-
notic process as a "truth serum").
141. People v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d 522, 531, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386, 391 (1980); Com-
ment, supra note 109, at 1216.
142. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(1976) (once the evidence is admitted and the decision to admit is affirmed on
appeal, the precedent controls until new information about the process becomes
available); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 388, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (1978).
143. Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 394, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 (1981); see also State v.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769-70 (Minn. 1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536-37,
432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181
Cal. Rptr. 243, 255, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kater,
388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983).
144. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 388, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (1978).
[Vol. 13
Hypnosis in Court
though they were acting upon nearly identical records. 14  In some
cases, the trier of fact would rule favorably upon the accuracy of the
hypnotic process, and in others it would rule against it. Not only do
inconsistent verdicts affront general principles of fairness, but they
mock the precision associated with science. The Frye standard's test
case feature provides a mechanism that would prevent these inconsis-
tencies while reducing the strain that repeated admissibility arguments
would place on crowded court dockets and frequently indigent
defendants.
Despite these attributes, the Frye standard is not without criticism.
Indeed, three major challenges have been leveled at the application of
Frye to post-hypnotic testimony. Critics contend that: (1) the Frye test
is facially inapplicable to hypnosis cases; (2) the test itself is obsolete;
and (3) the standard produces harsh results.
The connection between Frye and post-hypnotic recall is tenuous.
An examination of the text of Frye v. United States indicates that the
court may have intended to limit its holding to cases involving the use
of expert testimony: "While courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony. . . the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs."' 46 In support of the argument against
its application to hypnosis cases, opponents regard Frye as offering pro-
tection for jurors who might otherwise have been misled by convincing
expert testimony.' 47 This protection, though, is unwarranted when the
testimony of a nonexpert eyewitness is offered. Those who advocate
Frye's use in hypnosis cases respond by expanding upon their oppo-
nents' literal reading of Frye. These advocates view Frye's objective as
protecting the trier of fact from the misleading aura of certainty associ-
ated with all scientific evidence. Post-hypnotic recall is characterized
as scientific evidence because it is the product of a scientific proce-
dure, 48 and the evidence produced is only as reliable as the underlying
process used to produce it. "' Those who support the application of
Frye to hypnosis cases are therefore more concerned with the deceptive
nature of the evidence than with whether an expert is used to introduce
it. 150
145. Given the division among the state courts, it is inconceivable that juries could be
anymore inconsistent.
146. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis supplied).
147. State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 577-78, 414 A.2d 240, 244 (1980), vacated on
other grounds, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
381 Mass. 727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 122, 244
S.E.2d 414, 429 (1978); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 568, 329 N.W.2d
386, 393, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983).
148. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769-70 (Minn. 1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,
536-37, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981).
149. See supra note 143.
150. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 52-53, 641 P.2d 775, 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
263-64, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
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The historical treatment accorded Frye offers further support for
the proposition that it should not be applicable to hypnosis cases.
From its inception, Frye has normally been cited only in situations
where the product of scientific apparatus was offered as proof of the
truth of a given statement. 15' Post-hypnotic statements, in contrast, are
offered with all their faults as ordinary eyewitness testimony, without
indicating to the trier of fact that the statements are true. 152 It is prob-
able, however, that a combination of the subject's immunity from cross
examination, the aura of certainty that is created by characterizing hyp-
nosis as a scientific process, and the popular misconception that hypno-
tized people are incapable of lying, reveals that jurors are just as likely
to be misled by hypnotic testimony as they are by expert testimony.
Moreover, some authorities go beyond this policy analysis and assert
that, since post-hypnotic testimony is the product of a scientific process,
the Frye test is facially applicable.' 53 Therefore, the arguments that
Frye is limited to cases involving the results of a scientific apparatus
are based on a faulty premise.
General complaints about the inflexibility of the Frye test have
also affected its use in hypnosis cases. The inability of the standard to
respond to the recent proliferation of scientific evidence'54 and difficul-
ties associated with applying the test to specific situations 55 has per-
suaded an increasing number of jurisdictions to abandon it in favor of
a more flexible and less complicated standard. 56
The rigidity and conservatism embodied in the Frye test are re-
151. Eg., United States v. Distler, 672 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (gas chromatograph
analysis); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (hair follicle analy-
sis); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975) (voice spectrograph);
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970) (neutron activation analysis);
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (lie detector test).
152. See People v. Gibson, 117 11. App. 3d 270, 276, 452 N.E.2d 1368, 1373 (1983) (no
similar standard for ordinary eyewitness testimony); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M.
682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040
(N.M. 1982). As the Court of Appeals of Arizona explained, "[tihe heart of the
issue is the reliability of such procedure to revive a witness's memory or to
sharpen the witness's ability to perceive and recall, not whether hypnosis is an
infallible method of determining the truth from a witness." Beachum, 97 N.M. at
687, 643 P.2d at 251; State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 122, 244 S.E.2d 414, 429
(1978).
153. See supra note 143.
154. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of the Weight of Scientfic Evidence, 23
WM. & MARY L. REV. 261 (1981) (many of the new developments are attributable
to the influx of funding from various federal agencies).
155. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientic Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1204-28 (1980).
156. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Bailer,
519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Del. 1980);
Coppolino v. State, 233 So. 2d 168, 170-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). See gener-
ally McCormick, Scientfc Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67
IOWA L. REV. 879 (1982) (analysis of cases rejecting Frye); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 123, § 203 (Frye standard impractical and overly rigorous). But see United
States v. McFillin, No. 80-5063, slip op. at 6-9 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1981) (appellate
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vealed in an examination of the burden it imposes on the proponent of
a novel-evidence gathering technique. The sponsor must not only
demonstrate that the proffered results are accurate, but he must also
establish that the process has crossed the threshold of general accept-
ance in its scientific community. One commentator has characterized
this burden as requiring that the proponent demonstrate "unanimity
• ..in a world still believed by some to be flat."'' I 7 Evidence unable to
meet Frye's general acceptance standard is thus excluded, even though
the results in a specific case are accurate. Consequently, the trier of
fact is deprived of otherwise probative evidence to use in its search for
the truth.
The hypnosis cases provide an excellent example of the draconian
sanction the Frye test imposes upon proposed evidence that is unable to
meet its mandate. By excluding post-hypnotic testimony, the standard
often deprives the prosecution of the only eyewitness capable of impli-
cating the defendant. Without this evidence, an otherwise guilty de-
fendant must be set free.
Several jurisdictions, in an attempt to temper the harsh results ob-
tained by a sweeping application of Frye,'5 ' have retreated from the
total incompetency stance and have permitted hypno-enhanced testi-
mony about matters that the witness could recall prior to having under-
gone hypnosis. 59 In People v. Wallach, 6 ' for example, the Court of
Appeals of Michigan went to the extreme of articulating a Harding-like
standard that would permit defendants to use cross examination and
expert testimony to sever pre-hypnotic memory from potentially con-
court cast doubt on its rejection of the Frye test in Bailer by unflinchingly apply-
ing the Frye standard to "taggants").
157. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientfic Evidence, 1970 U. ILL.
L.J. 1, 14; see also Costley, Scientific Evidence-Admissibility Fryed to a Crisp, 21
S. TEX. L.J. 62, 67 (1980) (Frye, which requires infallibility, is a higher standard
than that required of other types of evidence).
158. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 545, 453 N.E.2d 484, 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 266
(1983) (court noted the "odd result" which would obtain if the only eyewitness
was declared incompetent).
159. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 209, 644 P.2d 1266, 1295
(1982) (court originally declared all post-hypnotic witnesses incompetent, but later
modified its holding to permit pre-hypnotic testimony); People v. Quintanar, 659
P.2d 710, 713 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Simkus v. State, 296 Md. 718, 464 A.2d 1055
(1983); Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536, 447 N.E.2d 1182 (1983); People
v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981), af'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329
N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 1981); State v.
Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 692, 331 N.W.2d 500, 504 (1983); People v. Hughes, 59
N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); Commonwealth v. Taylor,
294 Pa. Super. 171, 177, 439 A.2d 805, 808 (1982). Some jurisdictions have gone
beyond recognizing a distinction between pre- and post-hypnotic recollection and
have held, instead, that the former is absolved from any evidentiary problem be-
cause it is not the "product" of a hypnotic interview. United States v. Waksal, 539
F. Supp. 834, 838 (S.D. Fla. 1982); State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 661 P.2d
1315 (1983) (no need to follow procedural safeguards if no post-hypnotic recall
was generated).
160. 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981).
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taminated post-hypnotic recall.' 6' Other states have either articulated
similarly vague guidelines 62 or have refused to decide the question. 63
The difficulty experienced by the judiciary is understandable because
there is no established process that will reliably divide pre- from post-
hypnotic recall."' As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
candidly admitted, "[ilt will not be easy for lay witnesses to limit them-
selves to their pre-hypnotic memory."' 65 Indeed, one authority has
noted that it is "difficult to reconcile" these cases because the courts
involved have dwelled upon the pervasive influence that hypnosis ex-
erts over all memory and then have argued that the witness and the
adversary system can somehow determine which memories have re-
mained unaffected by hypnosis.'66 Although a more sensible approach
would be to preserve pre-hypnotic recall by deposition, 167 the problem
associated with declaring the only eyewitness incompetent would re-
main unaddressed.
C State v. Hurd - Let the Judge Decide
In an apparent effort to strike a balance between the extreme re-
sults achieved by proponents of unlimited admissibility and complete
exclusion, some states have followed New Jersey's lead and have
adopted guidelines to regulate hypnotic interviews if the results are to
161. Id. at 40, 312 N.W.2d at 404-05.
162. Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983) (disclosure and
cross examination used to attack the potential effect of hypnosis); People v.
Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 535, 453 N.E.2d 484, 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 267 (1983)
(full opportunity to test pre-hypnotic recall including a less vigorous application
of the hearsay rules).
163. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, for instance, has expressly declined to under-
take the duty of establishing guidelines for preserving pre-hypnotic recall, con-
ducting hypnotic sessions, or isolating post-hypnotic memories. The reason given
for refusing to clarify the law is that "[t]o do otherwise is to risk omission of
acceptable solutions which do not occur to us." State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670,
702-03, 464 A.2d 1028, 1045 (1983). The Collins court, however, did find the pro-
cedural safeguards employed by the Arizona courts persuasive. Id. (citing State
ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982)). Indeed,
the only guidance offered by Maryland's highest court is that pre-hypnotic recol-
lections must be established by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Metscher,
297 Md. 368, 374, 464 A.2d 1052, 1055 (1983).
164. See also State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981) (inability to
separate pre- from post-hypnotic recall supports a finding of per se incompe-
tence); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 68-69, 641 P.2d 775, 806, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 274 (it would "fly in the face of" the judicial consensus that hypnosis pro-
duces unreliable memories to rely upon the witness's uncorroborated statement
that memory is pre-hypnotic), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); State v. Collins,
296 Md. 670, 715-16, 464 A.2d 1028, 1051 (1983) (Murphy, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (Chief Judge Murphy expressed frustration over how tainted post-hyp-
notic memories could be separated from others).
165. Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983).
166. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 149 (N.D. 1983).
167. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232 n.1, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 n.l (1981).
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be admitted into evidence. 68 While various guidelines have been pro-
posed, 169 the six procedures adopted by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in State v. Hurd7 ° are thus far the most widely accepted.II 1
The Hurd standards require that the sponsor of hypnotically en-
hanced testimony lay a two tiered foundation before the witness will be
permitted to testify: (1) the hypnotic session was conducted according
to dictated procedures; and (2) the proffered testimony is generally reli-
able. These twin burdens must be satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence. 17
2
The Hurd guidelines provide that: (1) the session should be con-
ducted by a trained hypnotist; (2) the person conducting the interview
must be independent of all parties; (3) any information supplied to the
hypnotist prior to the beginning of the session must be in writing; (4)
before inducing hypnosis, the hypnotist should interview the subject to
determine the extent of pre-hypnotic recall; (5) all contacts between the
hypnotist and the witness must be recorded, preferably on videotape;' 17
3
and (6) only the hypnotist and the subject should be present in the
room while the session is in progress.174
The second level, general reliability, is somewhat elusive. The re-
liability inquiry is limited to general issues such as whether hypnosis
168. The safeguards were adopted at the urging of Dr. Martin Orne, a well-respected
authority on hypnosis and an often called expert witness. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J.
525, 545, 432 A.2d 86, 96 (1981).
169. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.675 (1981) (the nation's only statutorily de-
fined hypnosis gudelines); Ault, FBI Guidelinesfor Use of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 449 (1979) (detailing FBI guidelines);
Mutter, Critique of Videotape Presentation on Forensic Hypnotic Regression: "The
Case of Dora," 23 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 99, 100 (1979) (six guidelines);
Warner, supra note 22, at 428-29 (nine standards, as adopted by unreported Wis-
consin trial court); Comment, supra note 109, at 1230-32 (list of five safeguards).
170. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
171. State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied,
98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (N.M. 1982); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649
P.2d 845 (1982). Other jurisdictions have cited the standards as nonmandatory
persuasive authority for use when reviewing the reliability of a hypnotic inter-
view. Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Landry v. Bill
Garrett Chevrolet, 430 So. 2d 1051, 1056 (La. Ct. App. 1983). Even the Frye-test
states rely on the Hurd standards to minimize the detrimental effects of hypnosis
on pre-hypnotic recall. State ex re. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 210,
644 P.2d 1266, 1275 (1982) (record pre-hypnotic rendition and apply some of the
Hurd standards); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190
(1983); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 161 n.9, 310 N.W.2d 306, 314 n.9
(1981), af'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); see also State v. Collins, 296
Md. 670, 702-03, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044-45 (1983) (adoption of standards articulated
in Collins, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266, as a suggestion, but not mandatory).
172. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
173. Excerpts from hypnotic session transcripts are occasionally reproduced. See, e.g.,
Harker v. State, 55 Md. App. 460, 464-66, 463 A.2d 288, 291-92, cert. denied, 297
Md. 312 (1983); Crasilneck, The Case of Dora, supra note 20, at 95.
174. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
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was appropriate in light of the memory lost, the witness's motivation
for not remembering, whether the interview was suggestive, and the
amenability of the subject to hypnosis.'75 Furthermore, the Hurd court
specified that ordinary eyewitness testimony should be the measure of
accuracy when determining whether the memory produced is generally
reliable.' 76 More specific questions concerning factual accuracy are
relegated to the trier of fact.' 7 7 In short, the general reliability compo-
nent is quite limited.
In contrast to Harding, any adversarial exchange takes place
outside the jury's presence. The trial judge acts as gatekeeper because
he must determine whether the procedures were followed and that the
witness's present memory is not the product of a suggestive session. 78
The exchange, however, is somewhat limited. All challenges must be
confined to whether the appropriate procedures were followed or
whether the resulting memory is generally accurate since opposing
counsel is barred from litigating the general unreliability of the hyp-
notic process.' 79
Supporters of the safeguard approach argue that hypnosis has the
potential to make a valuable contribution by providing an otherwise
unavailable supply of information.' 0 Their essential inquiry is not
whether hypnosis is per se admissible or excludable, but rather they
search for the parameters of the hypnotic process.' 8' Using this infor-
mation, supporters of this approach have attempted to design a set of
procedures which can reside within the boundaries of reliability. 82
Recently, this inquiry has been analogized to an ordinary relevancy
inquiry 183 whereby the court weighs the probative value and prejudi-
cial impact of an evidentiary item; the conclusion reached is that, once
the proper procedures are followed, the probative value exceeds the
prejudicial impact.8 4
175. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
176. Id
177. Id
178. Id. at 543-44, 432 A.2d at 95-96.
179. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
180. Id at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
181. The prosecutor in Hurd stated that:
The hypnotic evidence is crucial in this case because it's the only way we
can tie the defendant in . . . . We have nothing else. We have no
fingerprints, and his alibi is that he was still home in bed, which cannot
be corroborated. We don't have the weapon. If the judge finds the hyp-
notic evidence inadmissible, there wouldn't be much sense in trying him.
We wouldn't have a case.
Jenkins, supra note 137, at 28.
182. Spector & Foster, supra note 75, at 577-78 (hypnotist who is aware of the
problems with hypnosis can act to minimize them); Spiegel, supra note 6, at 84.
183. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
184. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), where the court held that
hypnosis could satisfy a modified Frye test because, if carefully controlled, hypno-
sis "is generally accepted as a reliable means of obtaining accurate recall." Id at
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While some authorities have expressed "amazement" that the
Hurd court could cite so many defects associated with the hypnotic
testimony and still provide for its admission, I8 5 most have challenged
its underlying reasoning and have suggested that it ignored crucial ar-
eas of concern.
Questions directed to Hurd's underlying assumptions relate mostly
to whether suggested responses can be detected with any degree of cer-
tainty. Although videotaping sessions provide a record of overt and
obvious suggestions, it is possible that either the hypnotist or an investi-
gating officer will accidentally place a thought in the witness's memory
that will merge with actual recall under hypnosis.' 86 For example, it
cannot be determined with any degree of certainty whether an offered
identification of the accused is the product of actual recall or stems
from an unsuccessful pre-hypnotic lineup. Indeed, Hurd's candid ad-
mission that experts are unable to spot suggested responses8 7 has led at
least one court to challenge the New Jersey court's conclusion that a
judge is somehow better qualified to rule on whether a given session
was suggestive. 8 8
The second major criticism of Hurd is that its procedures com-
pletely ignore confabulation. Unlike suggestion, confabulation takes
place in the recesses of the subject's mind, beyond the reaches of the
videotape camera. 89 One court has gone so far as to charge that the
Hurd standards aggravate the problem by giving post-hypnotic testi-
539, 432 A.2d at 93; Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 88-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (N.M. 1982); Comment, supra note 109, at
1220-32 (illustrates procedures for applying federal rules of evidence to hypnosis
cases).
185. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 108, 436 A.2d 170, 176 (1981) (the
Hurd court's opinion is replete with problems associated with hypnotic memory
retrieval).
186. "[S]afeguards cannot insure that hypnotically recalled testimony is reliable ....
No matter how carefully the safeguards are followed, the risk of producing 'recall'
containing a mix of fact and fantasy is unavoidable .. " State ex rel. Collins v.
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 186, 206, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272, 1292 (1982); People
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 40, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255, cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); Comment, supra note 96, at 629.
187. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 539, 432 A.2d 86, 93 (1981) (difficult for an expert
reviewing a videotape to identify all "possible cues").
188. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39 n.24, 641 P.2d 775, 787 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 255 n.24 ("[i]f even an expert cannot confidently make that identification, it is
vain to believe that a layman such as the trial judge can do so"), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 133 (1982); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 160, 310 N.W.2d 306,
313 (1981), a/fd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982).
189. See People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 543-44, 453 N.E.2d 484, 494-95, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255, 265-66 (1983). Hughes rejected the Hurd safeguards because " 'the
greatest variable in hypnosis . . . is the individual himself.' No procedures have
yet been devised for eliminating the common risk that the subject . . . is more
likely to confabulate or fantisize . . . . Nor is there any scientific method for
detecting this type of 'recollection' . ... Id (quoting Dilloff, supra note 78, at
5).
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mony an "unearned indicia of reliability in the eyes of the jury."' 190
Procedural approaches also do not address any of the constitutional
problems raised by hypnotic memory stimulation.' 9'
The third major criticism is that, not unlike Harding, Hurd re-
quires a case-by-case resolution of the admissibility issue. Experts will
have to be retained to review the videotapes and testify at future court
appearances. Furthermore, the vague language used to define the relia-
bility standard provides a fertile field for litigation as parties struggle to
define the standard of reliability for ordinary eyewitnesses. 92
In light of its inability to provide guarantees of accurate results,
the Hurd approach, while indicative of a step in the right direction, is
an expensive and time consuming process that creates more problems
than it solves. Moreover, it places decisions concerning the reliability
of hypnotic evidence on an individual who is ill equipped to spot any
of the more subtle defects: the trial court judge. Other than reviewing
the hypnotic record to see that all procedures were followed, it is incon-
ceivable that the average jurist would be capable of determining the
reliability or suggestive nature of a hypnotic session. Even experts do
not claim to be capable of such a feat. Finally, the Hurd standards
offer little assistance to law enforcement officers because the guidelines
merely provide a post-hypnotic review of a hypnotic session. This has
the effect of forcing the state to gamble with its main witness: if all
goes well, they have a case; if something goes awry, the defendant goes
free.
V. SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION
Although the elusive nature of the hypnotic process suggests the
absence of an ideal solution to the problems it creates, the complete
exclusion of eyewitness testimony merely because the individual has
undergone hypnosis is a solution that too easily admits defeat. Because
of its potential judicial contributions, courts should not so easily dis-
miss hypnotic testimony. Instead, a solution to the hypnosis contro-
versy should consider the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches
discussed in the previous sections to discover an alternative that will
properly balance society's interest in prosecuting criminals with the
equally compelling goal of preventing erroneous convictions. The re-
sult is an amalgam of the most attractive features of each of the
theories.
From Harding comes the realization that the jury, not the experts,
eventually must decide a defendant's fate; only if the jurors are exposed
190. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. at 159-60, 310 N.W.2d at 313.
191. People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 713 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (rejects Hurd be-
cause cross examination problems remain unresolved).
192. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 207, 644 P.2d 1266, 1293
(1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
255, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
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to every conceivable shred of non-prejudicial evidence will their ability
to discover the truth be improved. From Frye comes the recognition
that the experts, not the jurors, are better equipped to understand and
properly resolve complicated scientific issues; their involvement in the
hypnosis debate protects defendants from erroneous and often prejudi-
cial information. Finally, from Hurd comes the notion that it is possi-
ble to design a hypnotic session that is capable of producing reasonably
reliable results; a criminal should not be set free merely because he has
succeeded in traumatizing his victim into an amnesic state.
The best methods of combining these considerations would be to
create a panel of experts, similar to the administrative tribunals found
in many agencies.' 93 This panel would resemble the science courts
which were the subject of debate during the last decade.' 9 4 In addition
to institutionalizing the "scientific jury" concept, it would avoid the ad-
vocacy bias frequently found in expert testimony supplied by interested
parties. 9'
The board would be primarily responsible for approving each ses-
sion by offering a detached and disinterested expert evaluation of the
need to employ hypnosis. Presently, decisions over the use of hypnosis
are made by law enforcement officers; such an important and poten-
tially incriminating decision should not be left to interested parties. In
determining whether hypnosis is appropriate, the board should con-
sider the status of police investigations, the type of information the wit-
ness is capable of providing, the potential harm which would occur if
the witness was later declared incompetent, and whether the state has
exhausted all other investigative procedures. The exhaustion require-
ment is essential to guarantee that procedures that are as unreliable as
hypnosis are only used as a last resort. Furthermore, it would provide
opposing counsel, who are frequently absent from hypnotic sessions,
with an inventory of investigative tactics that might have suggested the
identity of a specific defendant. The panel's post-hypnotic review
would be similar to the procedural review contemplated by Hurd with
the element of corroboration as an additional, but not decisive,
consideration.
193. See generally Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363 (1976) (details historical role of admininstrative expertise).
194. Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 13 TRIAL 48 (1977); Martin, The Pro-
posed Science Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977); see Commonwealth v. Lykus,
367 Mass. 191, 212-13, 327 N.E.2d 671, 682-83 (1975) (Kaplan, J., dissenting)
(judge called for the legislature to create a commission to handle questions involv-
ing the validity of new methods of scientific measurement and demonstration in
court).
195. An advocacy bias may lead to inconsistent results at trial. Compare Collins v.
State, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983) (hypnosis is unable to satisfy the Frye
test) with State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 567 n.14, 329 N.W.2d 386, 393 n.14
(1983) (court recognized a "strong argument" that hypnosis satisfies the Frye test).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The final resolution of the hypnosis issue must come from an in-
depth appraisal by the judiciary and the legislature of the problems
associated with hypno-enhanced testimony and the shortcomings in the
approaches taken to resolve them. Only from this searching analysis
can a proper balance be struck between the competing interests of pros-
ecuting criminals and preventing erroneous convictions. The idea of
creating a panel to review the decision represents an effort to achieve
such a balance, but it is not presented as the definitive solution. The
only answer that can be deduced with any degree of certainty is that the
approaches taken thus far have created confusion.
James Kevin Mac Alister
